Year 1 after Putin's war: political domino effect in Eastern Europe

„I am angry about our historic failure,” said Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, former German defense minister, five days ago. She was referring to the West’s failure to stop Putin after the crimes in Georgia, Crimea, and Donbas. But Putin’s crimes are now being broadcast live, and the West has finally lost any trace of naivety. It is a new era for the West. But what will happen to Putin’s Trojan horses in the East?

„Relations with Russia will no longer be determined by trade” – EU diplomacy chief Josep Borrell

The outcome of the war in Ukraine is unclear. Nobody knows what Putin wants, nobody knows how long the heroic Ukrainian army will resist. But one thing is certain: the crimes committed by the Russian army on Putin’s orders, the crimes against civilians – children, women, the elderly – will not be forgotten any time soon.

People in the West have been appalled by these crimes against humanity and have put enormous pressure on politicians to respond harshly. So did the civil society, Western journalists who harshly criticized the initial, extremely mild sanctions. After all, this is how real democracy works: politicians listen to the people. That’s how the unprecedented sanctions against Russia came about, that’s how German Chancellor Olaf Scholz took the historic decision to rapidly increase the defense budget and deliver lethal weapons abroad.

In the West, Russia is an outcast. More and more Western businesses are leaving Russia, which has become a great vulnerability. Politicians with pro-Russian rhetoric are now being shunned and treated as „collaborationists”. It will take decades for things to return to normal.

In the East, things are more complicated. There are still strong business ties to Putin’s oligarchs, debts created over decades of coexistence, and even Kremlin propaganda still has agents of propaganda.

Romania. The first, visible effect is the extremist AUR party. At 20% in the polls before the war in Ukraine, on an anti-western and anti-western discourse, AUR is beginning to fall, according to G4Media. The first indicator is the dismal failure of Simion’s rally, which has drawn some 2,000 people from across the country. All discourse and actions in tune with Putinist Russia are now rejected by most of the population, who instinctively understand the danger posed by AUR.

The second effect will be in the economy. President Iohannis has already announced a strategy of switching to renewable and nuclear energy and phasing out dependence on hydrocarbons. This is a tectonic shift with long-term effects.

The third effect is on the bilateral relations in the region. Romania is generally reluctant to any investment or idea coming from Russia because of its complicated history. Now it will have one more reason to look carefully at neighboring countries that are importing Russian money and Russian propaganda into Romania, as has been the case in recent years.

The Republic of Moldova. Total dependency on Russian gas is now limiting Chisinau’s room for maneuver. For Maia Sandu, Romania, and the EU, the zero priority is diversification of sources. Once it can rely on gas and electricity from other countries, the Republic of Moldova will be able to force, with Western support, the expulsion of Russian troops from Transnistria and the de facto reunification of the country. Only then can it hope for a real prospect of European integration.

Hungary. The Orban regime is a disgrace to its country. A real pawn of Putin, he is playing into Russia’s hands even now, first by blocking EU sanctions and then by refusing to allow access to weapons from allies to Ukraine. Through skillful propaganda, with almost all the media subordinated in the Russian style, Orban has frightened his people and stands a good chance of winning a new mandate in the parliamentary elections on April 3rd.

Once re-elected, the Orban regime must be treated by Romania as it deserves to be treated: as a loyal ally of Vladimir Putin, with a revisionist agenda, whose ultimate goal is co-sovereignty over Transylvania. Romania has tolerated the Orban government’s policies in Transylvania for too long. Now it’s time to label them for what they are: a type of ‘soft’ hybrid aggression.

These policies of the Hungarian government must be stopped diplomatically and legally by Bucharest and replaced with their own investment programs linking Transylvania to Bucharest, Iasi, Constanta, Timisoara – not Budapest. If it does not do this, the government will soon have a hotbed of ethnic problems in the heart of Transylvania, in the area inhabited by the Szeklers, which it will not be able to easily put out.

Moreover, under the pretext of assisting neighboring governments in their modernization, Viktor Orban has exported his Russian-inspired model to the Balkans. Through its Balkan partnerships, the Orban government is promoting policies that lead to segregation along ethnic lines, control of the media, and the promotion of anti-Western discourse. With an eye to its own revisionist agenda, Orban is also promoting the destabilizing agenda of the Kremlin, which is in favor of ethnic or ideological enclaves in the region.

Serbia. Another of Vladimir Putin’s political allies is Aleksandar Vucic, the president who is also preparing for an easy re-election. Serbia refuses to sign up for any sanctions against Russia, citing the Vucic regime’s dependence on Russian business and strong political and intelligence ties.

As with Viktor Orban, the autocratic Vucic regime has suppressed freedom of expression, stifled civil society, and wields power for its own benefit, sometimes even for Russia.

One of Vucic’s policies serving the Kremlin’s interests is fuelling tensions in Bosnia and Kosovo, making the Balkan region a permanent source of instability in Europe.

As Serbia is the most advanced candidate for EU membership, it is time for the Member States to send a clear message to Belgrade: as long as it maintains the state of conflict in the Balkans, the prospect of membership is zero.

Bulgaria. The neighboring country entered a new reformist dynamic with the installation of the Kiril Petkov government. A fervent advocate of distancing from Russia, Petkov has given every sign of promoting a pro-Western policy with real reforms.

Now is the time for Romania to address its major grievances with the Bulgarian government with the cards on the table and to resolve them together. The key issue is the completion by Bulgaria and Greece of the interconnector that would allow Romania access to natural gas from sources other than Russia, a project that has been unjustifiably delayed for six years.

Once Bulgaria shows good faith and keeps its side of the bargain, Bucharest and Sofia have a free hand to negotiate even closer cooperation than at present, with common infrastructure or economic goals.

And together with Bulgaria, Romania should also ask NATO to strengthen the alliance’s southern flank. Without a defense policy that is as harmonized as possible, defense in the face of possible Russian aggression will only be a fantasy.

In conclusion. This war is a litmus test for society and politicians in Europe. Now we know what Putin’s agenda is: revisionism, stirring up inter-ethnic tensions, dividing the West through the sovereignist current. For European politicians, there is no longer a soft option. Whoever plays the revisionist, sovereignist tune undermines Europe and the real need for the EU to have a truly strong and relevant foreign and security policy.

Translated from Romanian by Ovidiu Harfas